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Abstract
Political tolerance—the willingness to extend civil liberties to traditionally stigma-
tized groups—is pivotal to the functioning of democracy and the well-being of mem-
bers of stigmatized groups. Although political tolerance has traditionally been more 
common among American elites, we argue that as tolerance has increased, it has 
also diffused to less educated and less affluent segments of the population. The rel-
ative stability of political attitudes over the life course and the socialization of more 
recent birth cohorts in contexts of increased tolerance suggest that this diffusion of 
tolerance occurs across birth cohorts rather than time periods. Using age-period-
cohort models and more than three and a half decades of repeated cross-section-
al survey data, we find persistent and robust across-cohort declines in the impor-
tance of both income and higher education in determining levels of political toler-
ance. Declines in the effects of socioeconomic status are evident with tolerance to-
ward all five out-groups in the analysis—anti-religionists, gays and lesbians, com-
munists, militarists, and racists—but to varying degrees. These findings fit with a 
model of changes in public opinion, particularly views of civil and political rights, 
through processes of cultural diffusion and cohort replacement. 
Keywords: birth cohort, civil liberties, political attitudes, political tolerance, so-
cial change, social class. 
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Introduction 
Limiting civil and political rights due to individual attributes that are 
unrelated to political processes runs counter to the assumptions of the 
democratic form of government (Merriam 1938; Sullivan, Piereson, 
and Marcus 1982). Yet Americans have historically been intolerant of 
stigmatized groups such as gays and lesbians, atheists, and commu-
nists, and supportive of limiting the civil rights of those groups (Ed-
gell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Eisenstein 2006; Pettit and Sykes 
2015; Schafer and Shaw 2009; Stouffer 1955). This political (in)tol-
erance is strongly associated with socioeconomic status (SES), both 
in the United States and in other nations (Katnik 2002); but the asso-
ciation between SES and tolerance appears to be particularly robust 
in the United States (Karpov 1999). The highly educated and those 
with higher levels of family income are considerably more likely than 
the less educated and those from poorer families to support extend-
ing civil liberties to stigmatized “out-groups.” SES has been pivotal to 
theories of variation in political tolerance since Stouffer’s (1955) pi-
oneering work on the subject proposed that increases in education 
across birth cohorts would be the primary factor motivating greater 
tolerance (Davis 1975). Although SES has historically been one of the 
most robust predictors of political tolerance, we argue that as Amer-
icans have become more tolerant over the last few decades (Schafer 
and Shaw 2009), the connection between SES and political tolerance 
has declined. 
We approach changes in the relationship between SES and political 
tolerance from the diffusion perspective. Americans with high levels of 
social and economic status are often cultural innovators (Elias 2000; 
Rogers 2003). These cultural innovations, however, frequently spread 
to other social classes. This form of stratified diffusion (Young and 
Willmott 1973) is common to a variety of cultural innovations (Pam-
pel and Hunter 2012; Schwadel 2014; Wejnert 2002). Political theo-
ry contends that this process occurs across birth cohorts. Each gen-
eration or birth cohort is exposed to specific cultural, social, and po-
litical events that shape the cohort as a whole (Edmunds and Turn-
er 2002). Political perspectives in particular are often influenced by 
early life events (Alwin and Krosnick 1991), which suggests a cohort-
driven process of social change. 
S chwadel  &  Garneau in  So ciolo gical  Forum  32  (2017)       3
In this article, we analyze time period and birth cohort changes in 
the association between SES and political tolerance using hierarchical 
age-period-cohort models (Yang and Land 2013) and repeated cross-
sectional data from 1976 to 2014. We examine the changing effects 
of family income and college education on an overall political toler-
ance scale and on subscales that assess views toward five tradition-
ally stigmatized groups: anti-religionists, communists, gays and les-
bians, racists, and militarists. We find that political tolerance in gen-
eral increased substantially across time periods and is relatively high 
among baby boom cohorts. The focal results show that the influence of 
SES on political tolerance is considerably attenuated across successive 
birth cohorts. This pattern generally holds for each of the subscales of 
views of specific out-groups, though the magnitude of the decline in 
the effect of SES varies. Along with other recent research (e.g., Pam-
pel and Hunter 2012; Schwadel 2014), these results support the argu-
ment that cultural and attitudinal changes that originate with the up-
per classes tend to diffuse to the population as a whole, and that this 
process occurs across generations or birth cohorts. 
Political Tolerance and Social Class 
Political tolerance is defined as the “willingness to extend civil lib-
erties to political out-groups” (Karpov 2002:267). Political tolerance 
is pivotal to the proper functioning of democracy (Sullivan, Pierson, 
and Marcus 1982). In a tolerant society, even members of marginal-
ized political out-groups have the ability to express their views, which 
encourages political participation and diversity in political perspec-
tives. The principal of political tolerance, if not universal tolerance of 
all relevant groups, is essential to the democratic system of govern-
ment (McClosky 1964). Tolerance is also important for individual well-
being as the stigmatization of outgroups can lead to negative psycho-
logical consequences for those with a stigmatized identity (Goffman 
1963; Lee and Craft 2002). 
Since Stouffer’s (1955) seminal research on tolerance, social scien-
tists have documented Americans’ acceptance of various stigmatized 
groups. Much of this research has focused specifically on tolerance 
toward gays and lesbians, atheists and anti-religionists, communists, 
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racists, and militarists (e.g., Eisenstein 2006; Mueller 1988; Schafer 
and Shaw 2009; Stouffer 1955). While these groups have often ex-
perienced low levels of trust from the American public, tolerance to-
ward these groups has increased over the past several decades (Scha-
fer and Shaw 2009; Smith 1983). Changes in tolerance toward out-
groups are often attributed to demographic shifts in the American 
population, particularly increases in SES (Bobo and Licari 1989; Da-
vis 1975; Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 1978; Schafer and Shaw 2009; 
Schwadel and Garneau 2014; Treas 2002). 
Beginning with Stouffer’s (1955) and McClosky’s (1964) influen-
tial work on the subject, social scientists have emphasized the robust 
individual-level association between SES and political tolerance. In-
come and class mobility both positively influence tolerance toward 
out-groups (Katnik 2002; Schwadel and Garneau 2014; Stouffer 1955). 
Breadth in social networks is thought to play a key role in these asso-
ciations. SES is linked to greater diversity of social networks and more 
“weak ties” (Granovetter 1973; Lin 1999). Larger and more diverse so-
cial networks are in turn associated with increased tolerance and trust 
toward less trusted groups, in part because greater contact with out-
groups results in decreased stigmatization toward members of those 
out-groups (Couture and Penn 2003; Putnam and Campbell 2010). 
There is a great deal of research—from the 1950s to the present—
that shows that education is positively associated with political toler-
ance (e.g., Loftus 2001; Nunn et al. 1978; Stouffer 1955). Social scien-
tists emphasize the influence of education on cognitive processes and 
perspectives on diversity, which lead to greater tolerance. Bobo and 
Licari (1989:306), for example, conclude that “education is associat-
ed with more sophisticated styles of reasoning” that promote polit-
ical tolerance. In educational institutions, according to Sullivan and 
colleagues (1981:94), “one learns the principle that free exchange of 
ideas is necessary and that to be different is not necessarily to be bad 
and dangerous.” As Katnik (2002:18) notes, “It is primarily education. 
. . that has the most substantial effect on political tolerance.” 
College education in particular is thought to influence cognitive 
processes and introduce students to the importance of diversity, and 
thus encourage greater tolerance of out-groups (Schwadel and Gar-
neau 2014; Treas 2002). College or university education fosters less 
dogmatic forms of cognition (Beyerlein 2004) and produces a shift in 
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values that elevates the importance of diversity and tolerance (Gole-
biowska 1995). Institutions of higher education “foster better com-
munication of socio-cultural differences” to prepare students to func-
tion in an increasingly diverse society (Chang 2002:22). Similar to in-
come and class mobility, college education is also associated with larg-
er social networks and contact with a more diverse group of acquain-
tances (Marsden 1987), which result in greater acceptance of individ-
uals from stigmatized groups (Couture and Penn 2003; Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). For many students, college is their first exposure to 
meaningful interactions with diverse populations (Lawson, Komar, 
and Rose 1998), and such exposure during formative ages can have a 
lasting impact on social and political perspectives (Alwin, Cohen, and 
Newcomb 1991; Alwin and Krosnick 1991). Whether due to social net-
works, style of reasoning, or other causes, the extant literature sug-
gests that income and higher education are both strongly and posi-
tively associated with political tolerance. 
Changes in the Effects of Social Class on Political Tolerance 
Although education and income are two of the most robust predic-
tors of political tolerance, we argue that the effects of these SES indi-
cators have declined. Cultural innovations frequently permeate class 
boundaries, particularly in the United States. In fact, Lamont and Lar-
eau (1988) argue that instability in cultural markers and the need for 
continual cultural innovation by the upper classes is a key feature of 
American culture capital. Elias’s (2000) work on this subject is par-
ticularly influential. Elias describes how manners, in addition to oth-
er behaviors, were cultural markers that were once used to differen-
tiate the upper classes from other segments of society, but over time 
these class distinctions diminished as manners became more wide-
spread. While new beliefs, values, and behaviors frequently originate 
with the upper classes, they eventually spread to other social classes. 
Young and Willmott (1973) term this process the Principal of Strat-
ified Diffusion. Of course, it is also possible for cultural diffusion to 
occur in the opposite direction, from lower class to upper class. This 
has been argued in relation to fashion, for example (Field 1970), al-
though trends in the fashion industry are still set by elite actors (Crane 
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1999). It may be that the direction of innovation-diffusion across so-
cial classes depends on the social, political, and economic circumstanc-
es (Sorokin 1941). 
Contemporary diffusion literature portrays the highly educated and 
those with greater levels of income as “innovators” and “early adap-
tors” of cultural innovations, and the least educated and those with 
low levels of income as “laggards” in the process of cultural diffu-
sion (Rogers 2003). While the highly educated and affluent may be 
the first to exhibit new patterns of behavior and new values, as Pal-
loni (2001:68) explains, “In diffusion models, the behavior ‘spreads’ 
and is adopted by individuals irrespective of their socioeconomic po-
sitions.” This appears to be particularly likely to occur with what are 
often considered the liberal values and behaviors of high-SES individ-
uals (Pampel and Hunter 2012; Wejnert 2002). For instance, although 
religious apostasy or disaffiliating from religion was once largely lim-
ited to the college educated, as apostasy increased it also became just 
as common among less-educated Americans (Schwadel 2014). Bour-
dieu (1984) views this type of diffusion as a process of class emula-
tion. Most importantly for the present research, once a critical mass 
of people have adopted new ideas or values, the process of diffusion 
may become self-sustaining (Palloni 2001; Rogers 2003), leading to a 
potential decline in the effects of SES as a new idea or value becomes 
more widely accepted (Fischer and Hout 2006). Similarly, the effects 
of SES on political tolerance should decline as tolerance becomes more 
widespread. Consequently, our first hypothesis is that the effects of in-
come and higher education on political tolerance have declined. 
Aggregate change of this sort is often the result of changes across 
generations coupled with the process of cohort replacement. Empiri-
cally, changes in the influence of SES on political tolerance can occur 
either across time periods or across birth cohorts. Cohort changes re-
fer to changes across groups of people based on when they are born, 
and period changes refer to changes across points of time (e.g., years) 
that occur regardless of year of birth (Glenn 2005). Social change in 
general often occurs across birth cohorts, with changes in socializa-
tion, education, and exposure to specific cultural milieus during for-
mative years (Edmunds and Turner 2002). According to Mannheim 
(1952:290), “individuals who belong to the same generation, who 
share the same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a com-
mon location in the historical dimension of the social process.” In his 
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influential work on the subject, Ryder (1965) argued that such gener-
ation-specific socialization processes are pivotal to promoting social 
change. Political change in particular is often motivated by changes 
across birth cohorts because political perspectives are strongly influ-
enced by late adolescence and early adult socialization and life events, 
and they resist change as people age (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Alwin 
and McCammon 2007). Similarly, we propose that the process of cul-
tural diffusion discussed above manifests across birth cohorts. More 
recent cohorts are raised in contexts of relatively widespread politi-
cal tolerance. As political tolerance becomes more normative, differ-
ences in tolerance across levels of SES should diminish. Thus, our sec-
ond hypothesis is that declines in the effects of income and higher ed-
ucation on Americans’ political tolerance occur predominantly across 
birth cohorts. 
Differences by Out-Group 
Thus far, we have focused on political tolerance as a general concept. 
Tolerance of out-groups, however, varies by the out-group in ques-
tion. For instance, communists were an especially important politi-
cal out-group during the escalation of the Cold War (Smith 1983), but 
they have experienced increased political tolerance since the early 
1990s due to geopolitical changes related to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Schafer and Shaw 2009). The length of time that has passed 
since communists were popularly considered a serious threat to Unit-
ed States, with several birth cohorts maturing in contexts of dimin-
ished anti-communist propaganda, suggests that there has been con-
siderable diffusion of tolerance toward communists. Therefore, our 
third hypothesis is that the effects of income and education on tol-
erance toward communists in particular have declined precipitously 
across birth cohorts. 
In contrast to communists, growing tolerance toward gays and les-
bians is relatively new in the United States. Despite the historic stig-
matization of gays and lesbians in the United States, there has been a 
particularly notable increase in political tolerance toward these groups 
in recent years (Schafer and Shaw 2009). Compared to changes in tol-
erance of other groups, growth in tolerance toward gays and lesbians 
was more rapid and, relatedly, more reliant on period changes rather 
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than cohort changes (Schwadel and Garneau 2014). As Anderson and 
Fetner (2008:324) conclude, “views about homosexuality [are] a rare 
exception to the age stability hypothesis.” Indeed, many Americans 
report changing their views on homosexuality, which implies a pe-
riod effect. For instance, more than one-quarter of Americans who 
support same-sex marriage say they changed their view on the issue 
(Pew Research Center 2013). Thus, unlike views of other stigmatized 
out-groups, we expect declines in the effects of income and education 
on tolerance of gays and lesbians to occur at least partially across time 
periods rather than birth cohorts (Hypothesis 4). 
Finally, racists are one of the least tolerated out-groups in the Unit-
ed States. Not only are Americans relatively intolerant of racists, but, 
unlike most other stigmatized out-groups, tolerance of racists has re-
mained relatively low (Schafer and Shaw 2009; Schwadel and Gar-
neau 2014). This suggests that tolerance toward racists has not dif-
fused across levels of SES to the same extent as tolerance of other out-
groups. Consequently, we expect relatively small declines in the effects 
of SES on tolerance of racists (Hypothesis 5). 
Data 
We use data from the 1976 to 2014 General Social Survey (GSS) to ex-
amine changes in the association between social class and political 
tolerance. The GSS is a nationally representative survey of noninsti-
tutionalized American adults (Smith, Marsden, and Hout 2015). The 
survey has been conducted annually or biennially since 1972, although 
the full battery of questions about political tolerance was not added 
until 1976. Response rates range from 69%–80% based on Response 
Rate 5 as defined by the American Association for Public Opinion Re-
search (2008). Respondents below 25 years old are deleted from the 
sample to avoid limiting variation in higher education and because 
the survey is not administered on college campuses. The final sam-
ple size is 21,681.1 
1. After limiting the sample to respondents at least 25 years old and those with valid data on 
the focal variables of political tolerance, education, and family income, the sample size is 
22,408. Missing data on control variables led to the deletion of 727 cases. This is primar-
ily due to missing data on the political conservatism variable. Missing data on all control 
variables other than political conservatism resulted in the loss of only 160 cases. 
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The GSS asks respondents three questions about their views of 
each of the following stigmatized groups: gays and lesbians, commu-
nists, anti-religionists, racists, and militarists.2 Specifically, respon-
dents are asked if they approve of each of these groups making pub-
lic speeches (yes/no), if they approve of the group teaching in colleg-
es and universities (yes/no), and if they favor removing books by the 
group from public libraries (remove/do not remove). All 15 variables 
are recoded so the politically tolerant response is coded one (allow 
speeches, allow teaching, and do not remove books) and the nontoler-
ant response is coded zero (do not allow speeches, do not allow teach-
ing, and remove books). The primary dependent variable is an addi-
tive scale of all 15 variables, which is divided by 15 so that scores on 
the scale range between zero (nontolerant on all measures) and one 
(tolerant on all measures). Cronbach’s a for the scale is .920 (descrip-
tive statistics for all variables reported in Table 1). These items have 
been regularly employed in previous empirical research on political 
tolerance (e.g., Schafer and Shaw 2009; Schwadel and Garneau 2014). 
We also examine five tolerance subscales. Each subscale consists of 
the three variables (allow speech, allow teach, do not remove books) 
about a specific out-group. These out-group-specific scales are each 
divided by three so they range from zero to one. Cronbach’s a for the 
out-group-specific scales ranges between .734 and .817. 
The primary independent variables are age, period, birth cohort, 
education, and family income. Age is a continuous variable ranging 
from 25 to 89. Preliminary analyses reveal no nonlinear age effects. 
Each survey year is treated as a period. Birth cohorts are coded into 
five-year intervals, ranging from 1905–09 to 1980–84. Due to limited 
numbers of respondents at the tail ends of the cohort distribution, the 
oldest cohort includes all respondents born before 1905 and the most 
recent cohort includes all respondents born after 1984. Education is 
assessed with a dichotomous bachelor’s degree variable. A continuous 
family income variable, in constant (2000) dollars, is used to mea-
sure household income. The income variable is logged to adjust for the 
skewed distribution. The models include controls for other attributes 
that previous research (e.g., Schwadel and Garneau 2014) suggests 
2. The GSS also asked about views of socialists and Muslims. Unfortunately, the questions 
about socialists were only included in the 1972–74 surveys, and the questions about Mus-
lims were only included in the 2008–14 surveys. 
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are associated with political tolerance: sex, race, marital status, chil-
dren in the home, political conservatism, city size, living in the South, 
and both sectarian religious affiliation and no religious affiliation.3 
3. Sex is a dummy variable indicating female respondents. Race is assessed with dummy vari-
ables for African American and “other race” respondents, with whites as the reference cat-
egory. Dummy variables for currently married respondents and those with children un-
der 18 living in their homes gauge household composition and family formation. Politi-
cal conservatism is a seven-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely con-
servative. Dummy variables for urban (100 largest standard metropolitan statistical ar-
eas [SMSAs]), suburban (suburbs of 100 largest SMSAs), and rural areas control for city 
size, with other urban areas as the reference category. A dummy variable for respondents 
living in the South Census Region is used to control for regional variation. Dummy vari-
ables for those with no religious affiliation and those affiliated with sectarian Christian 
denominations control for religious affiliation, with other religious affiliates as the refer-
ence category. Sectarian affiliation is based on Smith’s (1990) operationalization of reli-
gious affiliations, which was chosen over other methods (e.g., Steensland et al. 2000) be-
cause it does not conflate religious affiliations with race.      
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
	 Mean		 SD		 Cronbach’s	α
Dependent Variables
Political Tolerance Scale  .652  .322  .920
Anti-Religionist Scale  .673  .375  .741
Gay and Lesbian Scale  .740  .374  .817
Communist Scale  .641  .399  .784
Racist Scale  .599  .390  .734
Militarist Scale  .606  .407  .797
Independent Variables
Bachelor’s Degree  .261  –  –
Family Income (log)  10.438  .934  –
Age  47.136  15.452  –
Political Conservatism  4.102  1.391  –
Female  .536  –  –
African American  .131  –  –
White  .822  –  –
Other Race  .047  –  –
Married  .565  –  –
Children in Home  .373  –  –
South  .345  –  –
Urban  .222  –  –
Suburban  .269  –  –
Other Urban  .384  –  –
Rural  .125  –  –
Sectarian Religion  .299  –  –
Other Religion  .591  –  –
No Religion  .110  –  –
N = 21,681
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Analysis Technique 
Hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models are used to analyze pe-
riod and cohort changes in the association between SES and political 
tolerance. HAPC models are random- or mixed-effects models. These 
models are preferable to non-nested and fixed-effects approaches for 
several reasons. For instance, there is the likelihood of shared random 
error within both periods and birth cohorts (Yang and Land 2013). 
Correlated error among those born at about the same time or surveyed 
in the same year can produce invalid statistical inference (Yang 2008), 
particularly underestimated standard errors and increased probabil-
ity of type I error (Hox and Kreft 1994). Cohort- and period-specific 
error terms in HAPC models compensate for this shared error. HAPC 
models are also more statistically efficient than fixed-effects models 
when using unbalanced data that contain an unequal number of re-
spondents in the cohort-by-period cells, which is the case in the GSS 
data (Yang and Land 2008). Most importantly, HAPC models allow 
for random slopes that model heteroscedasticity at the period and co-
hort level, which, for some research questions, make them preferable 
to fixed-effects models (Bell and Jones 2015; Fielding 2004). Indeed, 
random slopes for income and education are the focus of the analysis 
below. Recent simulation research by Reither and colleagues (2015) 
demonstrates that HAPC models provide reliable results when key as-
sumptions are met. Moreover, these models have been employed in 
other recent research on changes in political tolerance (e.g. Schwadel 
and Garneau 2014) and the results are robust to alternative ways of 
operationalizing age, period, and cohort. 
Hierarchical age-period-cohort models treat periods and cohorts 
as cross-classified level-2 units in a multilevel model. Individuals are 
the level-1 units of analysis. Age is modeled as a fixed-effects level-1 
variable. Random level-2 intercepts are used to gauge period and co-
hort effects. The individual or level-1 equation is as follows: 
Political Toleranceijk = β0jk + β1Ageijk + β2Incomeijk 
                                           + β3Educationijk + ∑
p
p=12 βpXp + eijk  
Each individual (i) is nested in both a birth cohort ( j) and a pe-
riod (k), β0jk is the cell mean for respondents in cohort j and period 
k, β1, β2, and β3 are the individual-level fixed effects for age, income, 
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and education, eijk is the individual-level error term, and βp represents 
other individual-level fixed effects (i.e., control variables). The level-2 
model is as follows: 
β0jk = γ0 + u0j + v0k 
In this equation, γ0 is the model intercept, which is the overall mean 
of political tolerance, and u0j and v0k are the residual random effects of 
cohort and period. These residual random effects can be interpreted 
as period-specific and cohort-specific effects (Yang and Land 2013). 
Random slopes are incorporated into the model as follows: 
β2jk = γ2 + u2j + v2k     
β3jk = γ3 + u3j + v3k 
In these equations, γ2 and γ3 are fixed-effects coefficients for in-
come and education, u2j and u3j are the cohort-specific effects of in-
come and education, and v2k and v3k are the period-specific effects of 
income and education. All analyses are weighted and conducted in 
HLM 7. Continuous variables are centered on their overall means. The 
results section is divided into two parts. First, we examine the gener-
al political tolerance scale. Second, we examine subscales that focus 
on each of the five outgroups. Figures (showing only on statistically 
significant [p < .05] results) highlight the key findings. 
Results 
Political Tolerance Scale 
The results from HAPC models of the political tolerance scale are re-
ported in Table 2. The upper half of the table reports fixed effects in 
the form of coefficients and standard errors for the independent vari-
ables. The lower half of the table reports random effects, specifically 
variance components that indicate the amount of variation in the in-
tercept and the slopes of education and income across periods and co-
horts. As expected, the fixed-effects results from Model 1 show that, all 
else being equal, both bachelor’s degree (b = .145) and family income 
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(b = .044) have strong, positive effects on political tolerance. More-
over, these are the two most robust predictors in the model—bach-
elor’s degree has the largest t-value of any of the independent vari-
ables and family income has the second largest t-value (not shown). 
The fixed-effects results in Model 1 also show relatively low levels of 
Table 2. Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Models of Political Tolerance Scale
                                                             Model 1                                     Model 2
Fixed	Effects	 b		 s.e.		 b		 s.e.
Intercept  .668  .015***  .657  .029***
Bachelor’s Degree  .145  .005***  .171  .015***
Family Income (log)  .044  .003***  .047  .004***
Agea  –.035  .004***  –.003  .003
Female  –.012  .004**  –.010  .004*
African Americanb  –.055  .007***  –.056  .007***
Other Raceb  –.136  .010***  –.138  .010***
Married  –.039  .005***  –.038  .005***
Children in Home  –.022  .005***  –.023  .005***
Political Conservatism  –.017  .002***  –.017  .002***
South  –.062  .005***  –.062  .004***
Urbanc  .015  .006**  .015  .006**
Suburbanc  .030  .005***  .029  .005***
Ruralc  –.052  .007***  –.050  .007***
Sectarian Religiond  –.077  .005***  –.076  .005***
No Religiond  .079  .007***  .077  .007***
Random	Effects																															Variance	Component																			Variance	Component
Period (Intercept)  .00166***  .00016***
Bachelor’s Slope   .00015**
Family Income Slope   .00000
Birth Cohort (Intercept)  .00212***  .01442***
Bachelor’s Slope   .00336***
Family Income Slope   .00012***
Individual (level-1)  .07496  .07455
Deviance  5,483  5,354†
Continuous variables grand-mean centered; N = 21,681
a. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 10
b. White reference
c. Other urban reference
d. Other religions reference
† Addition of random slopes improves model fit (p	< .001)
* p	≤ .05 ; ** p	≤ .01 ; *** p	≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
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political tolerance among women, nonwhites, older adults, those who 
are married or have children in their home, political conservatives, 
sectarian Christians, and those living in the South or in rural areas. 
Although our focus is on changes in the effects of income and ed-
ucation, we also extend previous research (e.g., Schafer and Shaw 
2009; Schwadel and Garneau 2014) by examining how political toler-
ance varies in recent cohorts and through the 2014 period. The vari-
ance components in Model 1 indicate that political tolerance varies 
across both periods (variance component = .00166) and birth cohorts 
(variance component = .00212). These period and cohort changes are 
depicted in Fig. 1. As the dashed line in Fig. 1 shows, political toler-
ance increased in a relatively linear manner from 1977 to 2014. Spe-
cifically, there was a .45 standard deviation increase in tolerance from 
the low point in 1977 to 2014. The solid line in Fig. 1 indicates large 
across-cohort differences, with baby boom cohorts—particularly those 
born between 1945 and 1954—being especially tolerant. This finding 
comports with research emphasizing the liberal values of members 
of the baby boom generation (e.g., Hout and Fischer 2002; Wuthnow 
1976). The question remains, as political tolerance has grown across 
periods and varied across cohorts, how have the effects of income and 
education changed? 
Model 2 adds random slopes for family income and bachelor’s de-
gree. The reduction in the deviance statistic signifies that the addition 
of the random slopes improves the model fit. The variance components 
Fig. 1. Estimated Period and Birth Cohort Changes in Political Tolerance Scale. Fig-
ure graphs results from Model 1 in Table 2.  
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indicate that the slopes of both family income (variance component = 
.00012) and bachelor’s degree (variance component = .00336) vary 
meaningfully across birth cohorts. The effect of bachelor’s degree, 
but not income, also varies significantly across time periods (vari-
ance components = .00015). Figure 2 depicts significant changes in 
the slopes of education and family income from Model 2. As Fig. 2a 
shows, there is a relatively linear, across-cohort decline in the effect 
of family income on political tolerance (no line shown for changes in 
effect of income across periods because variance component is not 
significant). The estimated coefficient for family income for the post-
1984 cohort (.036) is just over half the magnitude of the coefficient for 
Fig. 2. Estimated Period and Cohort Changes in Effects of Family Income and 
Bachelor’s Degree on Political Tolerance Scale. Figure graphs results from Mod-
el 2 in Table 2.  
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the pre-1905 cohort (.065). In the pre-1905 cohort, this equals a .75 
standard deviation difference in political tolerance between those two 
standard deviations above the mean of income and those two stan-
dard deviations below the mean of income. In contrast, in the post-
1984 cohort, there is less than a .42 standard deviation difference in 
political tolerance between those two standard deviations above and 
below the mean of income. 
The solid line in Fig. 2b shows a similar, relatively linear across-
cohort decline in the effect of college education. The estimated coef-
ficient for bachelor’s degree for the pre-1905 cohort (.283) is more 
than twice the size of the bachelor’s degree coefficient for the post-
1984 cohort (.124). Having a bachelor’s degree is associated with a .88 
standard deviation increase in political tolerance for the pre-1905 co-
hort and a .38 standard deviation increase in political tolerance for the 
post-1984 cohort. The dashed line in Fig. 2b indicates that although 
there is statistically significant variation in the effect of bachelor’s 
degree across periods, this variation is not substantively meaningful. 
Overall, these results show that political tolerance increased consider-
ably across periods, but the effects of both higher education and fam-
ily income declined precipitously across birth cohorts. Given the as-
sociation between education and income, it is important to note that 
across-cohort declines in the effects of the two SES measures are not 
dependent on controlling for each other (see Appendix A for random 
effects of income not controlling for education, and random effects of 
education not controlling for income). 
OutGroup-Specific Models 
Results from HAPC models of outgroup-specific tolerance scales are 
reported in Table 3. The fixed-effects results indicate that family in-
come and bachelor’s degree both have significant, positive effects on 
all five dependent variables. There is significant reduction in the de-
viance statistic in all the models in Table 3, which means the addition 
random slopes improve the model fit. Despite the general consisten-
cy in the effects of control variables across models, there are some in-
teresting differences. For instance, women are relatively tolerant of 
gays and lesbians but relatively intolerant of communists, anti-reli-
gionists, and racists. 
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The variance components indicate that the slope of bachelor’s de-
gree varies significantly across birth cohorts in all five models in Ta-
ble 3. Cohort-based variation in the effect of bachelor’s degree on the 
five subscales is depicted in Fig. 3a. In general, the effect of college 
education on tolerance declines from the pre-1905 cohort to the 1950s 
or 1960s cohorts, and is then relatively stable through the post-1984 
cohort. The magnitude of the decline in the effect of bachelor’s degree 
Table 3. Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Models of Tolerance of Specific Outgroups
																																														Gays	&	Lesbians									Communists												Anti-Religionists											Racists																			Militarists
Fixed	Effects		 	b	 	s.e.	 	b		 s.e.	 	b	 	s.e.	 	b	 	s.e.	 	b		 s.e.
Intercept  .740  .030***  .652  .026***  .686  .033***  .623  .016***  .594  .031***
Bachelor’s Degree  .142  .017***  .208  .014***  .176  .017***  .130  .012***  .192  .016***
Family Income (log)  .057  .005***  .051  .006***  .050  .006***  .030  .005***  .046  .004***
Agea  –.006  .004  –.006  .004  –.004  .003  –.018  .003***  –.013  .004***
Female  .034  .005***  –.033  .005***  –.018  .005***  –.039  .006***  .007  .005
African Americanb  –.006  .008  –.039  .009***  –.064  .008***  –.092  .009***  –.077  .009***
Other Raceb  –.103  .012***  –.133  .013***  –.146  .012***  –.133  .014***  –.170  .014***
Married  –.044  .006***  –.030  .006***  –.038  .006***  –.039  .006***  –.040  .006***
Children in Home  –.030  .006***  –.022  .006***  –.023  .006***  –.018  .007**  –.020  .006**
Political Conservatism  –.023  .002***  –.018  .002***  –.018  .002***  –.011  .002***  –.016  .002***
South  –.077  .005***  –.074  .006***  –.069  .005***  –.041  .006***  –.050  .006***
Urbanc  .033  .007***  .018  .007*  .013  .007  .003  .008  .008  .008
Suburbanc  .051  .006***  .027  .007***  .022  .006***  .024  .007***  .024  .007***
Ruralc  –.054  .008***  –.053  .009***  –.066  .008***  –.035  .009***  –.041  .009***
Sectarian Religiond  –.107  .006***  –.079  .006***  –.076  .006***  –.052  .007***  –.066  .007***
No Religiond  .034  .008***  .087  .009***  .095  .008***  .084  .009***  .088  .009***
	 Variance		 Variance		 Variance		 Variance		 Variance	 
Random	Effects		 Component		 Component		 Component		 Component		 Component
Period (Intercept)  .00225***  .00054***  .00005*  .00001  .00032***
Bachelor’s Slope  .00047**  .00030  .00009  .00005  .00038*
Family Income Slope  .00009**  .00004  .00006**  .00010*  .00005
Birth Cohort (Intercept)  .01322***  .01060***  .01823***  .00314***  .01624***
Bachelor’s Slope  .00399***  .00251**  .00439***  .00144***  .00366***
Family Income Slope  .00017***  .00042***  .00031***  .00005  .00001
Individual (level-1)  .10608  .12522  .10719  .13510  .13140
Deviance  13,036†  16,598†  13,216†  18,211‡  17,637†
Continuous variables grand-mean centered; N = 21,681
a. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 10
b. White reference
c. Other urban reference
d. Other religions reference
‡ Addition of random slopes improves model fit (p	< .05)
† Addition of random slopes improves model fit (p	< .001)
* p	≤ .05 ; ** p	≤ .01 ; *** p	≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
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is remarkably consistent in the models of tolerance of militarists, an-
ti-religionists, and gays and lesbians, with the coefficients for bache-
lor’s degree declining between .16 and .20 across birth cohorts. Still, 
there are notable differences across the models. In particular, the de-
cline in the effect of college education was steepest for tolerance of 
anti-religionists (.20 decline in coefficient across cohorts) and small-
est for tolerance of racists (.05 decline in coefficient across cohorts). 
As the results in Table 3 show, the slope of bachelor’s degree varies 
significantly across periods in the models of tolerance of militarists 
and gays and lesbians but not in the other three models. Figure 3b 
depicts these statistically significant variations. As this figure shows, 
the effect of college education on tolerance of gays and lesbians was 
Fig. 3. Estimated Period and Cohort Changes in Effect of Bachelor’s Degree on Tol-
erance of Specific Outgroups. Figure graphs results from models in Table 3.  
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relatively high in the 1970s and 1980s, with an average coefficient of 
.17 between 1976 and 1988. The effect of bachelor’s degree declined 
in the 1990s and 2000s, to .10 in 2014. While there is also signifi-
cant period-based variation in the effect of bachelor’s degree on tol-
erance of militarists, Fig. 3b shows that this variation is not substan-
tively meaningful. 
Turning to income, the variance components in Table 3 indicate 
that the slope of family income varies significantly across birth co-
horts in the models of tolerance of gays and lesbians, anti-religionists, 
and communists. These variations are depicted in Fig. 4a, which shows 
that the effect of income is remarkably similar for all three measures 
among the pre-1905 cohort, with coefficients between .076 and .083. 
Fig. 4. Estimated Period and Cohort Changes in Effect of Family Income on Toler-
ance of Specific Outgroups. Figure graphs results from models in Table 3.   
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Across-cohort declines in the effects of income on tolerance of both 
communists and anti-religionists are also highly similar. From the 
pre-1905 to the post-1984 cohort, the coefficient for income declines 
by .049 in the model of tolerance of communists and .052 in the mod-
el of tolerance of anti-religionists. Changes in the effect of income on 
tolerance of gays and lesbians are robust but not quite as large, with 
the coefficient declining from .076 for the pre-1905 cohort to .042 for 
the post-1984 cohort. 
Finally, the variance components indicate that the slope of family 
income varies significantly across periods in the models of tolerance 
of gays and lesbians, antireligionists, and racists. These period-based 
variations are depicted in Fig. 4b. Despite the statistically significant 
variation across periods, there is no clear pattern of change in the ef-
fect of income on tolerance of anti-religionists. Similarly, there does 
not appear to be an overall direction of change in the effect of income 
on tolerance of racists, particularly if we discount the swings in the 
coefficient in the first few years of the survey. In contrast, there is a 
notable period-based decline in the slope of income in the model of 
tolerance of gays and lesbians. The effect of income on tolerance of 
gays and lesbians declines from a high of .072 in 1985–1987 to .041 in 
2014. Overall, the results from the outgroup-specific models demon-
strate robust, cohort-based declines in the effect of bachelor’s degree 
on tolerance of all five outgroups, cohort-based declines in the effect 
of family income on tolerance of three of the five outgroups, and pe-
riod-based declines in the effects of both bachelor’s degree and fami-
ly income on tolerance of gays and lesbians. 
Discussion 
Political tolerance is pivotal to the functioning of democracy and the 
well-being of members of stigmatized groups. While there has been 
considerable growth in tolerance toward stigmatized outgroups, re-
searchers continue to find substantial differences in political tolerance 
across levels of SES (e.g., Bobo and Licari 1989; Karpov 1999; Schw-
adel and Garneau 2014). We investigate changes in this congruence 
between class stratification and support for outgroup civil liberties. In 
support of Hypothesis 1, the above results show large declines in the 
effects of SES on political tolerance. College-educated and high-income 
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Americans were once considerably more likely than the less educated 
and those with lower incomes to support the civil liberties of stigma-
tized outgroups. While these associations persist, they are reduced to 
the point where they are best described as moderate. The patterns of 
decline in the effects of both income and higher education are strik-
ingly similar. Although college education has spread and become more 
normative in recent generations, income inequality has persisted and 
even increased. Thus, the diffusion of tolerance across income and ed-
ucation categories does not appear to be due to changes in the makeup 
of those demographic groups. Instead, the findings fit with a model of 
diffusion as a process that becomes self-perpetuating once a thresh-
old of tolerance is achieved (Palloni 2001; Rogers 2003). 
In support of Hypothesis 2, declines in the effects of SES on polit-
ical tolerance occur predominantly across birth cohorts rather than 
time periods. This finding comports with the emphasis on early life-
course socialization and cohort replacement in the political social-
ization literature (e.g., Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Alwin and McCam-
mon 2007). Political tolerance in general increased across time peri-
ods, demonstrating a change in perspectives among the population as 
a whole. Nonetheless, declines in the effects of SES on tolerance rely 
on differences across birth cohorts. Maturing in periods of increased 
tolerance toward stigmatized outgroups appears to reduce the rele-
vance of SES, though the above analysis cannot establish such a caus-
al relationship. In contrast, among older cohorts who matured at a 
time when tolerance was relatively low, tolerant attitudes are dispro-
portionately consolidated amongst high-SES Americans. This finding 
extends recent research that shows cohort-based declines in the “lib-
eralizing” effects of SES on other social, political, and religious per-
spectives (e.g., Pampel and Hunter 2012; Schwadel 2014). Moreover, 
in contrast to long-standing theoretical assumptions (e.g., Davis 1975; 
Stouffer 1955), this finding suggests that if political tolerance is going 
to continue to increase, it will not do so because subsequent genera-
tions are more highly educated and thus more tolerant. 
The importance of cohort replacement in explaining cultural diffu-
sion has broader implications for social scientific research. Building 
on the findings in this article as well as Pampel and Hunter’s (2012) 
analysis of cohort-based changes in the effects of SES on views of the 
environment, future research should investigate if other shifts in pub-
lic opinion associated with class diffusion are occurring across birth 
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cohorts. Perhaps other social and political perspectives that were tra-
ditionally associated with the middle and upper classes, such as views 
of marijuana (Nielsen 2010) and same-sex marriage (Sherkat et al. 
2011), are also changing with younger cohorts of Americans “coming 
of age” in increasingly tolerant contexts. As Gans (1999:11) notes in 
relation to cultural choices, however, social-class convergence may be 
“quite selective.” 
The above results show that not all outgroups have experienced the 
same degree of diffusion of tolerance across levels of SES. In particu-
lar, the cohort-based decline in the association between higher educa-
tion and tolerance of racists is relatively small, and there is no mean-
ingful decline in the association between family income and toler-
ance of racists. These results support Hypothesis 5. Racists continue 
to be a particularly distrusted outgroup (Schwadel and Garneau 2014). 
Continued growth in the nonwhite proportion of the population com-
bined with the correlation between race and SES suggest that Ameri-
cans with low levels of SES may remain relatively intolerant of racists 
for some time. On the other hand, low- SES whites may increasingly 
view minorities in terms of economic competition, which may lead to 
increased acceptance of racism among low-SES whites. 
In contrast to views of racists, tolerance of communists and anti-
religionists exhibit the most consistent and robust across-cohort de-
clines in their association with SES. These results provide mixed sup-
port for Hypothesis 3. While we expected considerable diffusion in tol-
erance of communists due to the decades-long increase in tolerance of 
communists (Schafer and Shaw 2009), acceptance of anti-religionists 
is still a relatively recent phenomenon (Cox, Jones, and Navarro-Rive-
ra 2015; Edgell et al. 2006). Nonetheless, there have been consider-
able across-cohort increases in secularism, particularly lifelong sec-
ularism (Pew Research Center 2015; Schwadel 2010). In more recent 
cohorts, secularity has become more common among less-educated 
Americans in particular (Schwadel 2014). Consequently, more recent 
cohorts, and especially less-educated members of those cohorts, are 
more likely to be exposed to secular Americans during their formative 
years, which may have contributed to the strong, across-cohort de-
cline in the association between SES and tolerance of anti-religionists. 
Despite the preponderance of cohort changes, there are notable pe-
riod-based declines in the effects of education and income on tolerance 
of gays and lesbians, which supports Hypothesis 4. Rapid changes in 
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acceptance of homosexuality (Schwadel and Garneau 2014) as well 
as campaigns to broaden public awareness of issues facing gay and 
lesbian Americans (Walters 2001) may have promoted the relative-
ly quick, period-based diffusion in support for civil liberties for gays 
and lesbians across levels of SES. In contrast to cohort-based chang-
es, however, this period-based diffusion in tolerance toward gays and 
lesbians may be more ephemeral, reacting to period-specific political 
and social occurrences. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
ruled that same-sex marriage is now legal in all 50 states. Similar to 
previous culture “shocks,” this change may produce a backlash from 
some Americans (Putnam and Campbell 2010), which could reverse 
the period- based diffusion of tolerance of gays and lesbians across 
levels of SES. 
Limitations 
There are notable limitations to the above analysis. For instance, the 
dependent variables are additive scales of tolerance toward specific 
stigmatized groups. We are unable to employ other measures of polit-
ical tolerance such as the “least-liked” approach (Sullivan et al. 1982) 
or the “support for restrictive policies” approach (Davis 2007) due to 
lack of appropriate data (see Gibson 2013 for a review of political tol-
erance measurement). In regard to independent variables, data limi-
tations prevent us from controlling for important psychological dispo-
sitions such as dogmatism and perceived group threat, both of which 
have implications for tolerance (Gibson 2006; Sullivan et al. 1982). 
We are also limited in our ability to directly test for changes across 
the lifespan, or across generations within families. Despite declines 
in the effect of income, economic mobility may continue to influence 
political tolerance (Katnik 2002). Future research can employ longi-
tudinal data to address this possibility. Additionally, we are unable to 
directly test the diffusion of political tolerance across social classes. 
Future research can address this shortcoming by focusing on changes 
in cultural representations of various out-groups across class-based 
communities. Finally, although the HAPC models employed here ad-
just for the shared random error within periods and cohorts, there 
is no “solution” to the identification problem resulting from the lin-
ear dependency between measures of age, period, and cohort (Glenn 
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2005). Alternative approaches to assessing period and cohort change 
should be pursued in future research. 
Conclusions 
Since the advent of the discipline, sociologists have focused on the 
prevalence and implications of class stratification. Marx in particu-
lar viewed economic stratification as the primary factor determining 
other features of people’s lives. Indeed, contemporary research sug-
gests that SES influences various aspects of Americans’ lives, includ-
ing mental health (McLeod 2013), religion (Schwadel 2016), and, of 
course, political opinions (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993). Our find-
ings highlight one type of political opinion that has become less con-
nected to people’s place is the economic hierarchy. While class strati-
fication has serious implications for individuals’ well-being and oth-
er life circumstances, in more recent generations it is less determin-
istic of their views of granting civil rights to various outgroups. It re-
mains to be seen if such diffusion is occurring with opinions on oth-
er social and political issues. 
The results in this article add to the broader discussion of how at-
titudes and behaviors popularize across segments of the population. 
The findings comport with Young and Willmott’s (1973) Principle of 
Stratified Diffusion, which predicts a weakening role of social class, 
particularly in predicting types of family formation. The findings also 
support the model of cultural diffusion proposed by Rogers (2003), 
where highly educated and affluent Americans are cultural “innova-
tors” and those with lower levels of education and income are cultur-
al “laggards” that eventually “catch up” through cultural diffusion; or, 
according to Bourdieu (1984), through class emulation. With regard to 
SES and political tolerance, however, our results suggest that cultural 
diffusion is not the result of individuals deciding to adopt or emulate 
the tolerant views of other classes, which would likely be evident in 
period rather than cohort effects, but is instead due to differences in 
socialization and cultural exposure across birth cohorts. 
The diffusion of political tolerance demonstrated in the above anal-
ysis may have a positive impact on civic participation and, more gener-
ally, the functioning of American democracy (Dalton 1996; Sullivan et 
al. 1982). As Americans grow more comfortable allowing marginalized 
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groups to voice their opinions, there will likely be more diversity of 
public opinion. In this sense, the diffusion of political tolerance can 
lead to greater civic participation, which is essential for a properly 
functioning democracy (Putnam 2000). Widespread political toler-
ance is also likely to decrease the stigmatization of out-groups, which 
could further embolden stigmatized individuals to become more po-
litically active and vocal citizens. Broad support for the civil liberties 
of stigmatized groups, across social classes and potentially other im-
portant social cleavages, can thus improve the vibrancy of American 
democracy.  
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Appendix 1: Random Slopes from Models of Political Tolerance 
Scale with Either Family Income or Bachelor’s Degree 
Based on two models that are identical to Model 2 in Table 2 except one model does 
not have bachelor’s degree (frame a) and the other does not have family income 
(frame b). Variance components for slope of income (model without bachelor’s de-
gree): period = .00000 (n.s.), cohort = .00027 (p < .001). Variance components for 
slope of bachelor’s degree (model without income): period = .00015 (p < .001), co-
hort = .00480 (p < .001). 
 
